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The U.S. current account deﬁcit widened substan-
tially in 2000 as the lagged effect of strong growth in
the U.S. economy in late 1999 and early 2000 contin-
ued to drive up imports of goods and services faster
than exports increased. To a lesser extent, a decline in
U.S. price competitiveness also contributed to the
expansion in the deﬁcit.
Strong foreign economic growth supported a rapid
increase of U.S. exports of both goods and services in
2000. However, U.S. imports of goods and services
grew more than exports as U.S. gross domestic prod-
uct (GDP) accelerated in late 1999 and the ﬁrst half
of 2000. Both U.S. and foreign GDP growth slowed
sharply in the second half of 2000, but the lagged
effect of the previous acceleration continued to widen
the trade deﬁcit. The real trade-weighted value of
the dollar rose throughout the year, exerting a
restraining inﬂuence on exports and helping to
increase import demand. The net effect of these
developments was an expansion in the goods and
services trade deﬁcit of more than $100 billion in
2000 (table 1).
The investment income deﬁcit decreased modestly
in 2000 despite a growing net foreign liability posi-
tion. Strong growth abroad and the effect of high
oil prices on the proﬁtability of U.S. energy compa-
nies raised the rate of return on U.S. foreign direct
investment assets at the same time that the rate of
return on U.S. direct investment liabilities fell
slightly. The deﬁcit on unilateral transfers continued
to grow at a moderate pace.
The current account deﬁcit reached a new record
of nearly 41⁄2 percent of U.S. GDP last year (chart 1).
This deﬁcit represents an excess of U.S. investment
over U.S. saving of more than $400 billion. In addi-
tion, almost $300 billion of U.S. saving ﬂowed abroad
in the form of a continued increase in foreign direct
and portfolio investment by U.S. residents. To ﬁnance
the current account deﬁcit and the capital outﬂow, the
foreign private sector purchased a record amount—
more than $700 billion—of U.S. securities and direct
investment assets. Continuing a trend that began in
1999, more than 100 percent of net foreign private
securities purchases involved U.S. corporate bonds
and stocks (including agency securities); the foreign
1. U.S. international transactions, 1996–2000
Billions of dollars except as noted
Item 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 Change,
1999–2000
Trade in goods and services, net .............. − 102 − 106 − 167 − 265 − 368 − 104
Goods, net ................................ − 191 − 197 − 247 − 346 − 449 − 104
Services, net .............................. 89 91 80 81 81 0
Investment income, net ...................... 23 11 − 1 − 13 − 85
Compensation of employees, net .............. − 5 − 5 − 5 − 5 − 60
Unilateralcurrenttransfers,net ............... − 40 − 41 − 44 − 48 − 53 − 5
Current account balance .................... − 123 − 141 − 217 − 331 − 435 − 104
Of ﬁcialcapital,net .......................... 132 18 − 27 54 35 − 19
Privatecapital,net ........................... 25 250 174 269 364 95
Financial account balance .................. 158 268 147 323 399 76
Capital account balance .................... 101 − 414
Statistical discrepancy ...................... − 35 − 128 70 12 36 24
Memo
Current account as percentage of GDP ........ − 1.6 − 1.7 − 2.5 − 3.6 − 4.4 − .8
Note. In this and the tables that follow, components may not sum to totals
because of rounding.
Source. U.S. Department of Commerce, Bureau of Economic Analysis, U.S.
international transactions accounts.private sector was a net seller of U.S. Treasury securi-
ties. Net ofﬁcial inﬂows were down slightly from the
moderate pace of 1999.
MAJOR ECONOMIC INFLUENCES ON U.S.
INTERNATIONAL TRANSACTIONS
Many factors inﬂuenced the U.S. current and ﬁnan-
cial accounts in 2000. The most important of these
were the lagged effects of strong U.S. and foreign
growth in late 1999 and early 2000, the sharp rise
in oil prices in 1999 that continued into 2000, and a
further appreciation of the dollar—following a pause
in 1999—which built on earlier appreciations in 1997
and 1998.
Foreign Economic Activity
Following the slowdown of 1998, foreign growth
increased through 1999 and peaked at a 51⁄2 percent
annual rate in the ﬁrst half of 2000 (table 2). In the
second half of 2000, foreign growth slowed to 3 per-
cent at an annual rate, and for the four quarters of
2000, foreign GDP grew 41⁄4 percent. The pattern of
slowing from strong growth rates early in the year
was shared on average by the industrial countries and
by all major developing regions.
Among the major foreign industrial countries, the
strongest performers in 2000 were Canada and
Australia, which each grew 4 percent. The European
Union grew almost 3 percent and Japan, 23⁄4 percent.
Of these regions, the European Union exhibited the
least slackening in growth during the course of last
year.
In the foreign industrial countries, average inﬂation
edged up to 3 percent, a result mainly of higher oil
prices. During the ﬁrst part of the year, monetary
authorities moved to tighten conditions in many
industrial countries in reaction to continued strong
growth in economic activity that was starting to
impinge on capacity constraints, as well as some
upward pressures on prices. Interest rates on long-
term government securities declined on balance in
most industrial countries, especially toward year-end
1. U.S. external balances, 1970–2000















Source. U.S. Department of Commerce, Bureau of Economic Analysis.
2. Change in real GDP in the United States and abroad, 1997–2000
Percentage change, annual rate
Area 1997 1998 1999 2000
Half years
1998:H2 1999:H1 1999:H2 2000:H1 2000:H2
United States ............... 4.3 4.6 5.0 3.4 4.5 3.0 7.0 5.2 1.6
Total foreign1 ............... 4.3 1.2 4.8 4.2 1.8 4.5 5.1 5.5 2.9
Asian emerging markets2 .. 4.8 − 1.8 8.9 6.3 2.6 9.6 8.2 7.7 4.8
China .................. 8.2 9.5 6.2 7.4 12.4 1.7 11.0 5.7 9.2
Indonesia ............... 1.2 − 18.2 5.8 5.3 − 8.8 14.0 − 1.8 12.7 − 1.7
Korea .................. 3.4 − 5.2 13.8 5.2 6.9 15.2 12.4 6.5 3.9
Malaysia ............... 6.3 − 11.1 11.0 6.5 − 5.4 16.5 5.9 11.0 2.3
Philippines ............. 5.0 − 2.0 5.1 3.6 .9 6.3 3.8 4.9 2.3
T aiwan ................. 7.0 3.4 6.5 4.1 3.9 8.9 4.2 6.7 1.6
Latin America 3 ........... 6.1 1.2 4.3 4.7 − .5 3.0 5.6 7.4 2.1
Argentina .............. 7.6 − .5 − .6 − 2.0 − 6.2 − 4.1 3.2 − 2.8 − 1.3
Brazil .................. 2.4 − .8 3.4 4.3 − 4.0 3.5 3.4 3.8 4.8
Mexico ................. 6.7 2.8 5.5 5.2 2.4 4.5 6.4 8.7 1.7
Venezuela .............. 6.7 − 4.7 − 4.1 5.5 − 10.3 − 4.6 − 3.7 9.5 1.7
Canada ................... 4.8 3.2 4.9 4.0 4.5 4.1 5.8 4.5 3.5
European Union ........... 3.1 2.1 3.4 2.9 1.7 2.6 4.1 3.3 2.5
Japan ..................... .7 − 1.4 .4 2.8 − 1.9 4.1 − 3.1 5.4 .4
Note. Aggregate measures are weighted by moving bilateral shares in U.S.
exports of nonagricultural merchandise. Annual data are four-quarter changes.
Half-yearly data are calculated as Q4/Q2 or Q2/Q4 changes at an annual rate.
1. Selected regions and economies are shown below.
2. Weighted average of China, Hong Kong, Indonesia, Korea, Malaysia,
Philippines, Singapore, Taiwan, and Thailand.
3. Weighted average of Mexico, Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, and
Venezuela.
Source. Various national sources.
284 Federal Reserve Bulletin May 2001when evidence of a slowdown in global economic
growth started to emerge.
The improvement in overall ﬁscal positions of
the major industrial countries continued during 2000.
Partly as a result of one-time revenues from the sale
of mobile telephone licenses, the general government
balance of the euro area moved into surplus. The
Canadian surplus is estimated to have been 21⁄2 per-
cent of GDP last year. Even in Japan, where the
deﬁcit is estimated to have been nearly 61⁄2 percent of
GDP in 2000, there has been some movement toward
ﬁscal consolidation.
The experiences of major Latin American coun-
tries were mixed in 2000. Brazil enjoyed relatively
strong growth as a result of lower domestic nominal
and real interest rates. Mexico began 2000 with
extremely strong growth rates supported by high oil
prices, but growth slowed sharply in the second half,
in response partly to tighter monetary policy and
partly to slower growth in the United States late in
the year. Strong oil prices also supported a return to
growth in Venezuela last year. In contrast, Argenti-
na’s economy contracted substantially in 2000 after a
stagnant 1999. The Argentine government continued
to struggle to put policies in place that would bolster
market conﬁdence and support recovery.
Growth in Asian developing economies slowed
sharply during 2000, with the principal exception of
China. To a large extent, this pattern reﬂects the
importance of high-technology exports to the United
States and the slackening in U.S. high-tech imports
late in the year. Another contributing factor to the
Asian slowdown may have been the sustained high
price of imported oil. Finally, speciﬁc factors in
individual economies played a role in holding
down growth, including a resurgence of corporate-
restructuring problems in Korea and heightened
political uncertainty in Indonesia, the Philippines,
and Taiwan.
U.S. Economic Activity
After expanding briskly in the ﬁrst half, the U.S
economy decelerated dramatically in the second half
of 2000. For the year as a whole, GDP increased
31⁄2 percent (table 2). The major contributor to the
deceleration was business investment in equipment
and software, which slowed in the third quarter and
contracted in the fourth. The high-tech sector was
especially hard hit, but slowing growth in business
output, rising energy costs, and falling proﬁts took
their toll on business expenditures on motor vehicles
and other types of equipment as well.
Household spending on services advanced at a
rapid pace throughout the year. But spending on
goods stagnated in the second half, in part because of
an outright decline in motor vehicle sales. The slug-
gish pace of consumer spending was likely linked
to a less favorable labor market situation, decelerat-
ing real personal income, and the waning of positive
wealth effects from previous stock price increases.
In addition, there was probably some rebound from
the strong light vehicle purchases in 1999 and early
2000. Businesses were apparently caught off guard
by the slowing in ﬁnal sales last year, and inventories
built up, leaving inventory–sales ratios elevated at
year-end. Housing starts declined from a very high
level at the beginning of the year before ﬂattening out
as falling mortgage rates balanced the restraining
effects of a leveling-off of household wealth.
Real government spending rose only 1 percent
over the four quarters of 2000. Federal purchases
declined after a surge in spending in late 1999 due to
Y2K concerns. State and local government purchases
posted only a modest gain, as spending on investment
slowed from its rapid 1999 pace. The general govern-
ment surplus rose to 21⁄4 percent of GDP for the year
as a whole.
Oil and Other Primary Commodity Prices
The phrase ‘‘high and volatile’’ best describes oil
prices during 2000. The spot price of West Texas
intermediate, the U.S. benchmark crude, ﬂuctuated
between $24 and $37 per barrel last year and reached
levels not seen since the Gulf War in 1991 (chart 2).
Relatively high oil prices persisted throughout the
2. Oil prices, 1985–2000










Note. The data are monthly.
Source. Wall Street Journal and the U.S. Department of Commerce, Bureau
of Economic Analysis.
U.S. International Transactions in 2000 285year as a result of demand spurred by strong global
economic growth. The underlying strength of world
oil demand was apparent: Oil prices remained ele-
vated even as world oil production increased sharply.
Most of the expansion in production came from
the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries
(OPEC), which reversed the production restraints that
had been implemented in the previous two years.
Non-OPEC production rebounded as well, led nota-
bly by increases in the former Soviet Union.
The unusual volatility of oil prices during 2000
was the consequence of historically low levels of
crude oil and petroleum product inventories in the
United States and abroad. With little scope for
changes in inventories to accommodate ﬂuctuations
in supply and demand, large and rapid swings in oil
prices were common. For example, in September as
the spot price of West Texas intermediate approached
its high for the year, the U.S. government authorized
a release of 30 million barrels from the Strategic
Petroleum Reserve, and oil prices declined about
$7 per barrel within a few days. Oil prices soon
reversed this decline, however, but then fell $10 per
barrel during the last two months of the year as
evidence mounted that U.S. economic growth was
slowing.
Prices of non-oil primary commodities resumed
their decline last year, following a modest uptick in
late 1999 (chart 3). From 1997 through the ﬁrst half
of 1999, weak global demand, combined with a large
supply increase in response to the high prices of the
mid-1990s (especially for agricultural products), put
severe downward pressure on commodity prices.
Reduced supplies and the recovery in global eco-
nomic activity reversed this decline, and prices
strengthened in the second half of 1999. The combi-
nation of the strength of the dollar and the slowdown
in global economic growth led prices of non-oil pri-
mary commodities to resume their decline in mid-
2000. By the end of last year, the decline in prices
was particularly evident in the cyclically sensitive
commodities—metals and agricultural raw materials.
U.S. Price Competitiveness
Over 2000, non-energy price increases remained sub-
dued in the United States and in most of its trading
partners. As is usually the case, the major factor
contributing to gains and losses in U.S. international
price competitiveness has been the exchange value
of the dollar. After remaining ﬂat in 1999, the real
trade-weighted exchange value of the dollar in terms
of an index of a broad group of U.S. trading partners
appreciated 71⁄2 percent over the four quarters of
2000. As of year-end, the broad dollar index had
appreciated 27 percent from its previous low point in
July 1995 (chart 4).
The dollar’s movements last year differed signiﬁ-
cantly across the trading partners of the United States.
The dollar appreciated (in real terms) 20 percent
against the euro, 14 percent against the pound, 10 per-
cent against the yen, and 4 percent against the
Canadian dollar. The dollar’s appreciation against the
euro in 2000 followed an appreciation during 1999 of
3. Prices of world non-oil primary commodities, 1985–2000







Note. The data are monthly.
Source. International Monetary Fund, International Financial Statistics,
index of non-oil commodity prices in dollars.















Note. The broad dollar index included thirty-ﬁve currencies until the begin-
ning of stage three of European Economic and Monetary Union on January 1,
1999, when the euro replaced the ten euro-area currencies; the broad dollar
index now has twenty-six currencies. Currencies of all foreign countries or
regions that had a share of U.S. non-oil imports or nonagricultural exports of at
least 1⁄2 percent in 1997 are included in the broad dollar index. The data for the
euro use the restated German mark before January 1999. The data are monthly.
286 Federal Reserve Bulletin May 2001nearly 15 percent, and it persisted despite year-end
evidence that the U.S. economy had slowed to a rate
of growth below that of Europe. Against a weighted
average of developing country trading partners, the
dollar appreciated just over 2 percent in real terms
during 2000. A number of developing countries have
signiﬁcantly higher inﬂation rates than the United
States, so that their currencies tend to appre-
ciate against the dollar in real terms even when the
nominal exchange rate is constant or slowly depreci-
ating. For example, the Mexican peso appreciated
nearly 5 percent against the dollar in real terms last
year, primarily because of higher inﬂation in Mexico.
DEVELOPMENTS IN U.S. TRADE IN GOODS AND
SERVICES
The U.S. trade deﬁcit in goods and services was
substantially larger in 2000 than in 1999 (table 3).
The steep decline in the external balance reﬂected the
lagged effects on imports of robust economic growth
in the United States early in the year and the increas-
ing price competitiveness of foreign goods as the
dollar appreciated; together these factors outweighed
the pull on exports of generally strong economic
growth abroad during the ﬁrst three quarters of 2000.
Exports
The value of exports of goods and services rose
$113 billion in 2000 after a very small increase in
1999 (table 3). Receipts from services rose 9 percent,
more than twice the rate recorded in 1999, with much
of the increase recorded in receipts from foreign
travelers in the United States and ‘‘other private
services’’ (mostly business, professional, technical,
and ﬁnancial services). Sales of military equipment
declined slightly as did receipts from other govern-
ment services.
The value of goods exports expanded 13 percent
after a marginal increase in 1999. Capital equipment
3. U.S. international trade in goods and services, 1997–2000
Billions of dollars except as noted
Item 1997 1998 1999 2000
Dollar change Percentage
change,
1999 to 2000 1997 to 1998 1998 to 1999 1999 to 2000
Balance on goods and services ............ − 106 − 167 − 265 − 368 − 61 − 98 − 104 . . .
Exports of goods and services ............. 937 933 956 1,070 − 4 23 113 12
Services ................................ 257 263 272 296 5 9 24 9
Goods .................................. 680 670 684 773 − 91 4 8 9 1 3
Agricultural products .................. 58 53 50 53 − 5 − 34 7
Nonagricultural goods ................. 621 617 635 720 − 41 8 8 5 1 3
Capital equipment .................. 296 300 312 357 4 12 45 14
Aircraftandparts................. 41 54 53 48 12 − 1 − 5 − 9
Computers, peripherals, and parts .. 49 45 47 56 − 41 9 1 9
Semiconductors .................. 39 38 47 60 − 1 9 13 28
Telecommunications equipment ... 24 25 27 33 1 2 6 22
Other machinery and equipment ... 142 139 139 161 − 3 0 22 16
Industrial supplies .................. 148 138 139 163 − 9 1 24 17
Automotive products ................ 74 73 76 80 − 13 4 6
Consumer goods .................... 77 79 81 89 2 2 8 10
Other nonagricultural exports ........ 26 26 27 31 0 1 4 15
Imports of goods and services ............. 1,043 1,100 1,221 1,438 57 121 217 18
Services ................................ 167 183 191 215 16 9 24 13
Goods .................................. 876 917 1,030 1,223 41 113 193 19
Oil................................... 72 51 68 120 − 21 17 52 77
Non-oil .............................. 805 866 962 1,102 62 96 140 15
Capital equipment .................. 253 270 297 352 16 28 55 19
Aircraftandparts................. 17 22 24 26 5 2 3 11
Computers, peripherals, and parts .. 70 72 81 90 2 9 8 10
Semiconductors .................. 37 33 38 48 − 3 4 11 28
Telecommunications equipment ... 15 17 24 38 2 7 14 59
Other machinery and equipment ... 115 125 130 150 10 6 19 15
Industrial supplies .................. 146 152 157 181 7 5 24 15
Automotive products ................ 140 149 179 196 9 30 17 9
Consumer goods .................... 194 217 240 276 23 23 36 15
Food and other goods ............... 72 79 89 97 7 10 8 9
. . . Not applicable. Source. U.S. Department of Commerce, Bureau of Economic Analysis, U.S.
international transactions accounts.
U.S. International Transactions in 2000 287and industrial supplies accounted for most of the
growth in goods exports. There were strong increases
in high-tech equipment, such as computers, semicon-
ductors, and telecommunications equipment, as well
as in other machinery, such as power-generating,
industrial, and service equipment. Increases in
exported industrial supplies were spread widely
among categories and were especially strong in
petroleum products, steel, other metals, paper, chemi-
cals, and textiles. There was a smaller expansion in
exports of automotive products, consumer goods, and
agricultural products. Exports of aircraft and parts
declined moderately in 2000.
Although goods exports rose strongly during much
of the year, in the fourth quarter most categories of
exports fell. This reduction coincided with a sharp
slowing of growth rates both in the United States and
abroad. The U.S. slowdown contributed to the fourth-
quarter decline in exports because a large fraction of
U.S. high-tech and automotive exports are processed
abroad and returned to the United States for ﬁnal
sale.
Reﬂecting the strength of economic activity in
North America for most of the year, U.S. exports
to Canada and Mexico advanced rapidly in the ﬁrst
three quarters of 2000. This growth in exports to
Canada and Mexico continues a pattern evident since
the 1994 North American Free Trade Agreement of
stronger-than-expected exports to these countries (see
box). Exports to Mexico rose $25 billion in 2000, or
nearly 30 percent, with increases spread over all
major categories of trade (table 4). Capital equipment
exports to Mexico made up more than 35 percent of
the total, and industrial supplies, nearly 30 percent.
Automotive products (largely parts) accounted for
15 percent of exports to Mexico. Exports to Canada
Structural Change in U.S. Export Markets
In recent years, U.S. goods exports have grown faster than
would have been predicted by historical relationships based
on foreign GDP growth and relative prices. Examination of
the pattern of U.S. export growth across destination markets
suggests that this acceleration of goods exports is the result
of trade liberalization and the opening of markets abroad.
Chart 5 displays U.S. goods exports as a share of GDP in
ﬁve major markets: Australia, Canada, the European Union,
Japan, and Mexico, which together account for nearly
70 percent of total U.S. goods exports. The data are normal-
ized so that the U.S. export share of destination market GDP
is 100 in 1990. This normalization allows us to compare
changes in market penetration over time. To a reasonable
approximation, changes in foreign GDP and real exchange
rates should not affect market penetration in nominal terms.1
1. If the income and price elasticities of foreign demand for U.S. exports
are both equal to one, then the market penetration ratio is constant except for
structural change and (relatively minor) lagged volume adjustments. Esti-
mates of the income and price elasticities of U.S. goods exports are typically
close to one. See, for example, the long-run and short-run estimates in Peter
Hooper, Karen Johnson, and Jaime Marquez, ‘‘Trade Elasticities for the G-7
Countries,’’ Princeton Studies in International Economics No. 87, Princeton
University, August 2000.
Chart 5 shows that U.S. exports to Canada and Mexico
have increased much faster than Canadian and Mexican
GDP. We attribute this structural change to the U.S.–
Canadian Free Trade Agreement of 1989 and to the North
American Free Trade Agreement of 1994. Apparently,
barriers to U.S. exports have fallen substantially in these
countries, and U.S. businesses have taken advantage of the
opportunities created.
The data for exports to Australia and Japan provide little
evidence of structural change in the 1990s. However, U.S.
exports to the European Union have increased much faster
than European GDP in the past four years. This develop-
ment raises the intriguing possibility that the European
Single Market initiative of 1992 and the establishment of
European Economic and Monetary Union in 1999 have
increased the attractiveness of the European market for U.S.
exporters.
This study and other studies have found a higher estimate of the income
elasticity of U.S. goods imports, typically around two, compared with one for
exports. The source of this higher import elasticity is not clear, but it implies
that U.S. imports tend to grow faster than U.S. exports even when the U.S.
economy grows at the same rate as that of the rest of the world.
5. U.S. bilateral export values relative to destination GDP,
1990–2000










Source. U.S. Department of Commerce, Bureau of Economic Analysis;
various national sources.
288 Federal Reserve Bulletin May 2001expanded $12 billion, or 7 percent. Increases were
largely in capital equipment and industrial supplies.
Automotive products (one-fourth of U.S. exports to
Canada) declined in 2000, primarily in the second
half of the year.
Exports of goods to Asian emerging markets grew
$24 billion in 2000, or 23 percent. Almost all of the
increase was in capital goods (particularly high-tech
equipment), which accounted for 60 percent of U.S.
exports to that region. After gaining strength in the
ﬁrst three quarters, exports to this region accounted
for much of the decline in total U.S. exports in the
fourth quarter. Exports to Japan followed a more
muted pattern, rising moderately through the third
quarter before leveling off in the fourth quarter.
The value of exports to Western Europe rose
strongly in 2000, following several years of lack-
luster performance, as economic growth picked up
in the area. Capital equipment constituted nearly
55 percent of U.S. exports to Western Europe in
2000, and industrial supplies another 20 percent. In
contrast to most other regions, exports to Western
Europe continued to rise in the fourth quarter, even as
total U.S. goods exports declined.
The quantity of exports rose 7 percent in 2000
(Q4/Q4), substantially faster than in the previous two
years (table 5). Increases were spread across most
major categories of trade, with the exception of air-
craft exports, which declined.
Prices of goods exports rose 3⁄4 percent in 2000
(table 6). When computers, semiconductors, and agri-
cultural products are excluded, the increase in the
index for export prices was larger, 13⁄4 percent, which
was about the same rate as in 1999. Stronger growth
in prices of exported industrial supplies and aircraft
was moderated by small rises in prices of other
machinery and automotive products. Prices of agri-
cultural exports declined 1⁄2 percent, the smallest rate
of decrease in four years. Prices of computers and
semiconductors (measured by hedonic indexes) con-
tinued to decline.
Imports
The value of imports grew 18 percent in 2000, nearly
twice as fast as in 1999, with increases recorded in all
major categories of trade (table 3). The expansion
of imports was fueled by the sharp growth of U.S.
domestic expenditures throughout most of the year,
the increasing price competitiveness of foreign goods
as the dollar appreciated, and the rise in the price
of imported oil. Oil and capital equipment each
accounted for one-quarter of the rise in imports;
consumer goods accounted for another 17 percent;
4. U.S. exports of goods to its major trading partners,
1997–2000
Billions of dollars
Destination 1997 1998 1999 2000 Change,
1999 to 2000
Total goods exports .. 680 670 684 773 89
W esternEurope ...... 153 159 163 178 16
Canada .............. 152 156 167 179 12
LatinAmerica ........ 135 142 141 171 29
Mexico ............ 71 78 87 111 25
Other countries ..... 64 63 55 59 4
Asia ................. 183 154 161 193 32
Japan .............. 65 57 56 64 8
Other Asia1 ........ 118 97 104 129 24
All other 2 ............ 57 59 53 53 − 1
1. Includes China, Hong Kong, Singapore, Taiwan, Indonesia, Philippines,
Malaysia, and Thailand.
2. Includes Australia, New Zealand, Middle East, Eastern Europe, and Africa.
Source. U.S. Department of Commerce, Bureau of Economic Analysis, U.S.
international transactions accounts.
5. Change in the quantity of U.S. exports and imports of
goods and services, 1997–2000
Percent, fourth quarter to fourth quarter
Item 1997 1998 1999 2000
Exports of goods and services ......... 92 47
Services .............................. 1 3 0 3
Goods ................................ 12 2 6 8
Capital equipment ................... 18 5 7 13
Aircraftandparts ................. 8 49 − 18 − 14
Computers, peripherals, and parts .. 26 7 13 24
Semiconductors ................... 21 9 34 27
Other machinery and equipment ... 17 − 87 1 5
Industrial supplies ................... 6 − 36 7
Automotive vehicles and parts ....... 14 − 23 0
Consumer goods .................... 7 1 6 6
Agricultural products ................ 1 0 0 7
Imports of goods and services ......... 14 11 12 11
Services .............................. 14 9 2 13
Goods ................................ 14 12 14 11
Oil ................................. 4 5 − 41 3
Non-oil ............................. 15 12 15 11
Capital equipment ................ 25 11 19 20
Aircraftandparts ............... 26 31 − 22 3
Computers, peripherals,
andparts .................. 33 27 25 15
Semiconductors ................ 33 − 73 4 2 3
Other machinery and
equipment ............... 17 6 17 21
Industrial supplies ................. 7 9 9 1
Automotive vehicles and parts ..... 8 16 15 2
Consumer goods .................. 14 10 15 14
Foods, feeds, and beverages ....... 9 5 11 7
Note. Quantities are measured in chained (1996) dollars.
Source. U.S. Department of Commerce, Bureau of Economic Analysis,
national income and product accounts; and the Federal Reserve Board.
U.S. International Transactions in 2000 289and automotive products, industrial supplies, and ser-
vices each accounted for about 10 percent.
Oil Imports
The quantity of U.S. imports of crude oil and petro-
leum products increased 13 percent over the four
quarters of 2000. Despite robust economic growth
through the ﬁrst half of the year, U.S. ﬁnal demand
for oil was essentially unchanged from 1999, a reﬂec-
tion, at least in part, of the effects of high oil prices.
High prices also helped to stabilize domestic oil
production in 2000 after several years of declines.
With ﬂat consumption and production, one would
normally not expect such a strong increase in
imports. The explanation lies in the fact that oil
imports in 1999 were moderated by a considerable
drawdown in oil inventories. With U.S. oil stocks
near historically low levels by the end of 1999, a
boost in oil imports was required just to keep con-
sumption constant. Reﬂecting both higher quantities
and prices, the value of U.S. oil imports grew 50 per-
cent in 2000 (Q4/Q4).
Non-Oil Imports
The quantity of non-oil imports grew 11 percent
in 2000 (Q4/Q4, table 5). Reﬂecting the strength of
spending by both households and businesses in the
United States, the quantity of imported consumer
goods (other than automotive products) rose 14 per-
cent, and the quantity of imported capital equipment
increased 20 percent. The slowdown in U.S. GDP
growth that occurred during the second half of the
year was reﬂected in a drop in the growth of goods
imports from a pace of more than 15 percent at an
annual rate during the ﬁrst three quarters of the year
to about zero growth in the fourth quarter. Imports of
automotive products, which increased only 21⁄2 per-
cent during the year, turned down in the fourth quar-
ter as U.S. sales of vehicles dropped back from the
very high levels recorded earlier in the year. In addi-
tion, there were signiﬁcant declines in the fourth
quarter in the quantity of imported high-tech equip-
ment and industrial supplies. Fourth-quarter increases
were recorded for imports of other capital equipment
and of consumer goods and services, albeit at a
somewhat slower pace than in the ﬁrst half of the
year.
Overall, U.S. non-oil import prices rose 1⁄2 percent
in 2000 (table 6). When prices of computers and
semiconductors are excluded, the import price
increases were larger, 11⁄2 percent. Much of the rise
in these prices was attributable to industrial supplies,
whose prices surged more than 10 percent, an
increase led by prices of natural gas, paper, non-
ferrous metals, fertilizers, and organic chemicals. In
contrast, prices of other imported goods, such as
machinery other than computers and semiconductors
and consumer goods, declined at rates of just over
1 percent in 2000, rates only slightly different from
those recorded during the previous two years. The
hedonic indexes of prices of computers and semicon-
ductors continued to drop in 2000.
DEVELOPMENTS IN THE NONTRADE CURRENT
ACCOUNT
The two major components of the current account
other than trade in goods and services are investment
income and unilateral transfers.
Investment Income
Net investment income is the difference between the
income that U.S. residents earn on their holdings of
6. Change in prices of U.S. exports and imports of goods and
services, 1997–2000
Percent, fourth quarter to fourth quarter
Item 1997 1998 1999 2000
Total exports of goods and services .... − .8 − 2.6 1.0 1.3
Services ............................ .8 − .2 2.9 2.6
Goods .............................. − 1.5 − 3.5 .3 .7
Agricultural products .............. − 3.2 − 10.1 − 5.1 − .5
Nonagricultural goods ............. − 1.3 − 2.9 .7 .8
Computers, peripherals,
andparts .................. − 11.0 − 12.7 − 6.9 − 4.4
Semiconductors ................ − 13.3 − 5.6 − 3.6 − 4.3
Other goods .................... .6 − 1.9 1.7 1.8
Industrial supplies ............ − .5 − 7.3 4.1 4.0
Aircraft...................... 2.6 1.2 2.6 4.5
Other machinery ............. 1.2 − .1 .3 .7
Automotive products ......... .7 .4 .8 .6
Consumer goods ............. .8 − .5 .1 .0
Total imports of goods and services ... − 4.2 − 5.0 3.6 2.4
Services ............................ − 2.3 − .4 3.2 − 1.2
Goods .............................. − 4.6 − 5.9 3.7 3.1
Oil............................... − 20.2 − 35.7 93.6 31.9
Non-oil .......................... − 2.8 − 3.6 − .7 .6
Computers, peripherals,
andparts .................. − 14.8 − 16.4 − 10.6 − 6.1
Semiconductors ................ − 14.9 − 8.2 − 2.7 − 2.9
Other goods ................... − .8 − 2.0 .4 1.4
Industrial supplies ............ − .1 − 6.8 4.3 10.6
Aircraft...................... 3.4 1.7 1.6 3.4
Other machinery ............. − 3.2 − 1.3 − 1.6 − 1.1
Automotive products ......... .6 − .3 .9 .7
Consumer goods ............. − 1.3 − 1.2 − .6 − 1.1
Foods, feeds, and beverages ... .1 − 3.0 − 3.1 − 2.4
Source. U.S. Department of Commerce, Bureau of Economic Analysis,
national income and product accounts; chain-weighted indexes; and the Federal
Reserve Board.
290 Federal Reserve Bulletin May 2001foreign assets (receipts) and the income that foreign-
ers earn on their holdings of U.S. assets (payments).
Traditionally (since 1914), the balance on investment
income has been positive, but starting in the early
1990s it began a persistent decline that brought it
to near zero in 1998 and to negative $13 billion in
1999—a net payment position (chart 6). This recent
decline in net investment income has resulted pri-
marily from the fact that, over the period, the United
States has experienced large net ﬁnancial inﬂows
from the rest of the world. That is, foreign acquisition
of U.S. assets has vastly exceeded U.S. acquisition of
foreign assets. Although the net ﬁnancial asset posi-
tion is the primary determinant of net investment
income, changing rates of return on these assets also
affect the balance. In 2000, net investment payments
were $8 billion, slightly less than in 1999. Although
large ﬁnancial inﬂows last year tended to increase net
payments, the inﬂows were more than offset by an
increase in the rate of return on U.S. direct invest-
ment abroad and a decline in the rate of return on
foreign direct investment in the United States.
Direct Investment Income
Net direct investment income—the difference
between receipts from U.S. direct investment abroad
and payments on foreign direct investment in the
United States—increased almost 35 percent in 2000,
to $84 billion dollars. Direct investment receipts grew
a robust 26 percent (table 7). Despite a slowdown in
the last half of the year, payments grew 18 percent
over 1999.
The growth in receipts reﬂected strong GDP
growth abroad in the ﬁrst three quarters of the year, a
rising stock of direct investment capital, and the
effects of high oil prices on the proﬁtability of U.S.-
based international energy corporations. Receipts
grew strongly despite the offsetting effect of the
strength of the dollar vis-a `-vis many of the important
host countries for U.S. direct investment, which low-
ered the dollar value of proﬁts earned in foreign
currencies.
Major increases in direct investment receipts were
registered for Western European countries, particu-
larly the United Kingdom, and for Canada, Japan,
and a number of other Asian countries. Receipts from
Latin America were ﬂat for the second straight year.
Mirroring the overall strength of receipts, the rate of
return on the direct investment position rose to
101⁄2 percent—more than 1 percentage point higher
than in 1999 (chart 7).1
Although income payments on direct investment in
the United States, at $66 billion for 2000, increased
1. In charts 6–9, the investment receipts (or payments) scale is
one-tenth of the investment position scale, and thus when the receipts
(or payments) line coincides with the top of the position bar, the
implied rate of return is 10 percent.
6. U.S. net international investment:
















Note. The net position data are averages of the end-of-year positions for the
current and previous years. The year-end position for 2000 was constructed by
adding the recorded portfolio investment ﬂows during 2000 to the recorded
year-end position for 1999. The net position excludes U.S. gold holdings and
foreign holdings of U.S. currency.
Source. U.S. Department of Commerce, Bureau of Economic Analysis; and
the Federal Reserve Board.
7. U.S. net investment income, 1995–2000
Billions of dollars
Item 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 Change,
1999 to 2000
Investment income, net ......................... 25 23 11 − 1 − 13 − 85
Direct investment income, net .................. 65 69 72 68 63 84 21
Receipts .................................... 95 103 116 106 119 149 31
Payments ................................... 30 33 44 39 56 66 10
Portfolio investment income, net ............... − 40 − 46 − 61 − 69 − 76 − 92 − 16
Receipts .................................... 114 120 140 150 155 194 38
Payments ................................... 154 166 201 219 231 286 55
Source. U.S. Department of Commerce, Bureau of Economic Analysis,
U.S. international transactions accounts.
U.S. International Transactions in 2000 291signiﬁcantly over 1999, the growth slowed consider-
ably in the second half of 2000 as the U.S. economy
cooled. The overall rate of return, at about 5 percent,
was 1⁄4 of a percentage point lower than that in 1999
(chart 8).
With the net direct investment position continuing
its trend decline toward zero, the large positive bal-
ance on direct investment income was primarily the
result of the long-standing higher rate of return on
U.S. direct investment abroad than on foreign direct
investment in the United States. The reasons for the
differential in the rates of return are not well under-
stood, but age-related factors appear to be important:
Foreign direct investment in the United States is
typically newer than U.S. direct investment abroad
and hence is more likely to be incurring startup and
restructuring costs and less likely to have fully real-
ized the gains from operational experience.
Portfolio Investment Income
Portfolio receipts reﬂect the dividends and interest
that U.S. residents receive on their holdings of for-
eign ﬁnancial assets, whereas payments reﬂect the
dividends and interest that foreigners receive on their
holdings of U.S. ﬁnancial assets. The Bureau of Eco-
nomic Analysis (BEA) estimates these payments and
receipts by using estimates of the holdings of various
types of assets combined with estimates of the inter-
est or dividend-payout rates for the various assets.
Portfolio income excludes any capital gains or losses
(realized or not) that result from changes in the price
of the underlying assets.
Although portfolio income is affected by changes
in interest rates and the composition of the assets
held, the primary determinant of net portfolio pay-
ments is the net portfolio asset position, which is
illustrated in chart 9. As shown in the chart, net
portfolio income turned negative in 1985 when the
net investment position moved from one of net credi-
tor to net debtor, and it has followed the general
contour of the net investment position since. Between
1999 and 2000, net income declined $15 billion, to
negative $92 billion. This decline reﬂects a further
deterioration of the net asset position as well as a
7. U.S. direct investment abroad:


















Receipts from U.S. investments abroad
Position
Note. The position data are averages using the current-cost measures as of
year-end for the current and previous years. The year-end data for 2000 were
constructed by adding the recorded direct investment capital ﬂows and current
cost adjustment during 2000 to the recorded year-end position for 1999.
Source. U.S. Department of Commerce, Bureau of Economic Analysis; and
the Federal Reserve Board.
8. Foreign direct investment in the United States:






















Payments to foreign investors in the United States
Position
Note. The position data are averages using the current-cost measures as of
year-end for the current and previous years. The year-end data for 2000 were
constructed by adding the recorded direct investment capital ﬂows and current-
cost adjustment during 2000 to the recorded year-end position for 1999.
Source. U.S. Department of Commerce, Bureau of Economic Analysis; and
the Federal Reserve Board.





















Note. The net position data are Federal Reserve Board estimates of the
average position during the year. Through 1999 these are based on quarterly
ﬁnancial ﬂows and year-end position estimates published by the BEA. For 2000,
the average is based on year-end 1999 position data and quarterly ﬁnancial ﬂows
during 2000. The net position excludes U.S. gold holdings and foreign holdings
of U.S. currency.
Source. U.S. Department of Commerce, Bureau of Economic Analysis; and
the Federal Reserve Board.
292 Federal Reserve Bulletin May 2001general increase in interest rates, which raised the
rate of return on portfolio assets.
Unilateral Transfers
Unilateral transfers include government grant and
pension payments as well as private transfers to and
from foreigners. In 2000, net unilateral transfers
recorded a deﬁcit of $52 billion, $4 billion more than
in 1999. About half the increase was in private remit-
tances, and half was in government grants.
FINANCIAL AND CAPITAL ACCOUNT
TRANSACTIONS
The counterpart to the increase in the U.S. current
account deﬁcit in 2000 was an increase in net ﬁnan-
cial inﬂows. As in 1999, U.S. ﬁnancial ﬂows in 2000
reﬂected the relatively strong cyclical position of the
U.S. economy and the global wave of corporate merg-
ers. Foreign private purchases of U.S. securities were
exceptionally strong—well in excess of the record set
in 1997.
The composition of U.S. securities purchased by
foreigners continued the shift away from Treasuries
that began in 1999, as the U.S. budget surplus and the
attendant decline in the supply of Treasuries lowered
their yield relative to that of other debt securities.
Last year sales by private foreigners were, on net,
$52 billion in Treasury securities, compared with
net sales of $21 billion in 1999 (table 8). Although
sizable, these sales were slightly less than they would
have been had foreigners reduced their holdings in
proportion to the reduction in Treasuries outstanding.
The increased sale of Treasuries was fully offset by
larger foreign purchases of U.S. securities issued by
government-sponsored agencies. Net purchases of
agency securities topped $110 billion, compared with
the record $72 billion set in 1999. In contrast to
the shrinking supply of Treasury securities, U.S.-
government-sponsored agencies accelerated the pace
of their debt issuance. Private foreign purchases of
U.S. corporate and other bonds (including agencies)
grew to a record $294 billion, while net purchases of
U.S. equities ballooned from $99 billion in 1999 to
$172 billion.
The pace of foreign direct investment inﬂows also
accelerated from the record pace of 1999. As in the
previous two years, direct investment inﬂows were
driven by foreign acquisition of U.S. ﬁrms, which
reﬂected the global strength in merger and acquisi-
8. Composition of U.S. ﬁnancial ﬂows, 1995–2000
Billions of dollars
Item 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000
Current account balance .............................. − 110 − 123 − 141 − 217 − 332 − 435
Ofﬁcial ﬁnancial ﬂows, net ............................ 99 132 18 − 27 54 35
Foreign ofﬁcialassetsintheUnitedStates............. 110 127 19 − 20 43 36
U.S. ofﬁcial reserve assets ............................ − 10 7 − 1 − 790
Other U.S. government assets ........................ − 1 − 1003 − 1
Private ﬁnancial ﬂows, net ............................ 14 25 250 174 269 364
Net inﬂows reported by U.S. banking ofﬁces .......... − 45 − 75 8 4 − 3 − 31
Securities transactions, net ........................... 73 135 225 131 183 290
Private foreign net purchases of U.S. securities ...... 196 285 344 267 311 414
Treasury securities .............................. 100 155 146 49 − 21 − 52
Corporate and other bonds ...................... 83 119 128 172 233 294
Corporate stocks ................................ 14 11 70 46 99 172
U.S. net purchases of foreign securities ............. − 123 − 150 − 119 − 136 − 129 − 124
Bonds ......................................... − 57 − 67 − 61 − 35 − 14 − 25
Stocks ......................................... − 65 − 83 − 58 − 101 − 114 − 99
Stock swaps ................................. − 7 − 11 − 3 − 96 − 123 − 80
Direct investment, net ............................... − 41 − 5 1 40 125 155
Foreign direct investment in the United States ....... 58 87 106 186 276 317
U.S. direct investment abroad ...................... − 99 − 92 − 105 − 146 − 151 − 162
Foreign holdings of U.S. currency .................... 12 17 25 17 22 1
Other............................................... 14 − 47 − 9 − 18 − 58 − 51
Capital account balance .............................. 0101 − 41
Statistical discrepancy ................................ − 4 − 35 − 128 70 12 36
Source. U.S. Department of Commerce, Bureau of Economic Analysis,
U.S. international transactions accounts.
U.S. International Transactions in 2000 293tion activity. Of the $317 billion in direct investment
inﬂows in 2000, almost $200 billion was directly
attributable to merger activity. Many of these merg-
ers were ﬁnanced, at least in part, by an exchange of
equity, in which shares in the U.S. ﬁrm were swapped
for equity in the acquiring ﬁrm. Although U.S. resi-
dents generally appear to have sold a portion of the
equity acquired through these swaps, the swaps likely
contributed signiﬁcantly to the $124 billion capital
outﬂow attributed to U.S. acquisition of foreign secu-
rities. U.S. direct investment abroad was also boosted
by merger activity and totaled $162 billion in
2000—a modest increase over 1999.
Financial inﬂows from foreign ofﬁcial sources
totaled $36 billion in 2000—a slight decrease from
1999. Nearly all of the ofﬁcial inﬂows were attribut-
able to reinvested interest earnings. Modest ofﬁcial
sales of dollar assets associated with foreign
exchange intervention were offset by larger inﬂows
from some non-OPEC oil exporting countries, which
beneﬁted from the elevated price of oil. U.S. govern-
ment assets abroad (ofﬁcial and other) were little
changed on balance last year.
Capital account transactions—which consist
mainly of debt forgiveness and wealth transfers asso-
ciated with immigration—netted to positive $1 bil-
lion last year. In 1999, they were negative $4 billion,
most of which reﬂected the transfer of the Panama
Canal to the Republic of Panama.
PROSPECTS FOR 2001
Opposing forces have been at work on the U.S.
current account balance since late 2000. The contin-
ued appreciation of the dollar into the ﬁrst few
months of 2001 will tend to increase the goods and
services trade deﬁcit this year as the adjustment pro-
cess unfolds. In addition, the ongoing deterioration of
the U.S. net international investment position will
tend to increase the deﬁcit on investment income.
However, domestic spending growth appears to have
slowed more sharply than foreign spending growth
recently, which puts more downward pressure on
the growth rate of imports than on that of exports. If
these circumstances persist, the current account deﬁ-
cit is likely to change much less in 2001 than it did in
2000.
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